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Introduction 
Fo  he EU, Canada i  a ong all  and a e  good f iend. Canada ha e  o  i ion 
of the world, our values and our objectives. We are both passionate believers in 
democracy, rule of law, human rights, solidarity among people and nations, as well as 
rules-ba ed in e na ional o de , he hen e iden  of he E o ean Co ncil Donald 
Tusk remarked at the EU-Canada summit in Montreal in July 2019. Both partners, the 
EU and Canada, decided a  he mmi  o intensify EU-Canada relations and step up 
coo e a ion o add e  global challenge  (E o ean Co ncil, 2019). A ema kable 
statement in turbulent times.  
The international environment is becoming increasingly contested, divided and 
disorderly. Both Canada and the EU confront an unprecedented number of external 
challenges. Global order is transforming, with the influence of the West declining vis-
à-vis the rising political and economic power of countries like China. This is 
compounded by increasing contestation of multilateralism and high volatility of US 
foreign policy on the background of a strong US preference for bilateralism and a 
stronger emphasis on its national interests under the Trump administration. For the 
EU, threats are also coming from its crisis-prone and conflict-laden neighbourhood in 
the South, a shared neighbourhood with an increasingly assertive Russia in the East, 
and a fall back to old power games in its relations with the UK and the US in the West. 
All this is against the background of internal challenges such as diverse crises, internal 
conflicts about its core values and the Brexit process. This unprecedented turbulence 
and internal and external changes, suggest the EU is facing new realities (COST Action 
17119, MoU, online). 
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The new realities have aggravated the situation within the EU and added a new layer 
of complexities to a long-time struggle of the EU and its member states for recognition 
in the international arena. If the EU and the member states want to remain relevant 
actors at the interna ional le el, hen he EU need  o e abli h and main ain 
con c i e ela ion hi  i h e i ing and eme ging o e  on he o ld age  
(Whitman and Rodt, 2012, p. 42). The EU possesses a number of instruments to secure 
such relations. One of the most prestigious is the instrument of Strategic Partnership. 
It identifies a group of established and emerging powers which includes Brazil, Canada, 
China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Korea, South Africa and the US.  
This Special Issue focuses on the EU-Canada relations and on their Strategic 
Partnership in particular. The relations are long-lived  they date back to the 1970s  
but only recently did they experience significant deepening. EEAS Deputy Secretary 
General Pedro Serrano noted in an encouraging manne  ha  The EU-Canada 
relationship  like brandy  ha  go en be e  and be e  i h age  (2016). A ong 
and colourful statement, it hints that if only we give time to a strategic partnership, it 
will develop and blossom. The reality of other strategic partnerships, as well as 
assessments coming from Canada, are somewhat different. Time dimension seems to 
play a critical role in those views, but in a particular way. Within the Special Issue, our 
team of contributors tackles the following questions: 
x How did the EU-Canada Strategic Partnership develop over time?  
x What are the drivers for the Strategic Partnership  in the past, present and 
future? 
x What are the interests / strategies of the partners, and how do they evolve over 
time, when new challenges face the EU, Canada and the world? 
x Which conflicts can we detect in the past and present? How do they shape the 
interaction from now on?  
x What is the role of the EU vs. the role of the EU member states in the future 
for this Strategic Partnership? 
x What perceptions and expectations are assigned to those roles? 
x Where can we detect new opportunities for cooperation, now and in the 
foreseeable future?  
Our Introductory article starts answering these questions. We first introduce the EU 
Strategic Partnerships as an instrument of EU policy. We follow with some evidence 
and lessons learned from our research on EU-Strategic Partnerships with emerging 
o e . We ack imila i ie  and diffe ence  be een he EU  mo e ecen  
partnerships with emerging powers vis-à-vis the EU-Canadian partnership as one of 
the oldest partnerships. From this point, we move on to describe the specific features 
of the EU-Canada Strategic Partnership with special emphasis on its deepening in the 
last years. Here, we present a number of the distinct drivers of this Partnership. The 
introduction ends with an overview of all the contributions to the Special Issue.  
EU Strategic Partnerships 
In the last 25 years, the EU has built up its Strategic Partnerships at the bilateral level 
as its response to global power shifts. This initiative reveals that the EU makes an effort 
to better position itself in a globalised world (Gratius, 2013, p. 1) and gain allies in an 
effective multilateral order within the UN framework (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014, 




respectively, followed by Japan in 2001. The Strategic Partnerships with emerging 
powers of China and Russia were initiated in 2003, while the EU and India formed a 
Strategic Partnership in 2004. The more recent partnerships with other emerging 
powers were concluded with Brazil (2007), South Africa (2007), Mexico (2010) and 
So h Ko ea (2010). The EU  inc ea ed a en ion o eme ging o e  eflec  global 
power change . I  i  al o a g ed o be mbolic of he oli ical ill of he EU o be a  
of he ne  global game  (G a i , 2013, . 2). The fo me  High Re e en a i e for 
Foreign Affairs, Catherine Ashton suggested more Strategic Partnerships for the EU in 
the future (with Egypt, Israel, Indonesia, Pakistan and Ukraine) (Rettman, 2010). 
Ho e e , e  o a d  making he e a ne hi  a egic  ha e no  e  been aken. 
Nevertheless, the EU and Ukraine signed an Association Agreement in spring 2014 
(ratified in 2017). The main obstacle in the prolonged process of its ratification was the 
negative vote by the referendum in the Netherlands in April 2016 (Van der Loo 2016). 
Indone ia i  men ioned in he EU Global S a eg , in he con e  of e anding he EU  
partnerships (EEAS, 2016a, p. 38). In contrast, Egypt, Pakistan and Israel are not 
add e ed in he Global S a eg  a  f e a ne . The e i  onl  a efe ence o like-
minded and a egic a ne  in A ia, Af ica and he Ame ica  (EEAS, 2016a, . 43) 
in relation to tackling global challenges, but without reference to any specific country 
(Knodt et al., 2018, p. 59f). 
Even though the initiative of strategic partnerships is quarter of a century old, the 
concept remains unclear, as the EU still lacks a clear definition of this term (Knodt et 
al., 2015c, . 6). A decade ago, an EU di loma  a ed, I  like lo e  no one can define 
i . Yo  onl  kno  ha  i  i  hen o  e e ience i  (ci ed in Re man, 2010). In he 
same period, in 2010, the-then President of the European Council, Herman Van 
Rompuy, expressed concern about the lack of strategizing vision for the EU in this 
ini ia i e: Un il no , e had a egic a ne , no  e al o need a a eg  (Co ncil 
of the European Union 2010). A diplomat remarked that i  i  no  clea  he he , 
indeed, he o he  ega d  a  hei  S a egic Pa ne  (ci ed in Re man, 2010). I  
also seems that the EU was not always aware of its Strategic Partnerships. In 2003, the 
E o ean Sec i  S a eg  a ed ha  he EU ho ld look to develop strategic 
a ne hi  i h Ja an, China, Canada and India  (E o ean Co ncil, 2003, . 14), 
overlooking the fact that the EU at that time had already established Strategic 
Partnerships with Japan and Canada. This insecurity about the definition and 
significance of its Strategic Partnerships has had consequences for the way the EU 
choose its strategic partners. The choice did not necessarily take place in a 
aigh fo a d a . Mo eo e , he choice of a ne  eflec ed he EU  inabili  o 
agree and decide which third actors are genuine strategic partners and consequently 
its inability to behave strategically in relation to these partners (Keukeleire and 
Bruyninckx, 2011, p. 389, Knodt et al., 2018, p. 60).  
Ne e hele , he EU  ongoing commitment to the idea of Strategic Partnerships 
shows that the EU is set up to deliver comprehensive, contractual, rule-based 
relationships with its strategic partners in the long term (Whitman and Rodt, 2012, p. 
36). As such, the Strategic Partnerships seem to be an aspiration rather than a reality. 
In mo  ca e , he a egic a ne hi  i h he eme ging o  e-emerging powers is 
rather a goal to be pursued through a gradual process of interaction than a reflection 
of reality. In practice, there has been a lack of clear means of implementing the 
objectives and political goals within the strategic partnerships. The partnership 
policies often consist of a vague and general catalogue of common political aims which 
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are hidden by a rhetorical façade (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014, p. 291, Knodt et al., 
2018, p. 62). 
An im o an  e  fo a d o im o e he S a egic Pa ne hi  a  he E o e 2020 
S a eg  ado ed in 2014. I  e en ed he Pa ne hi  In men  a  a ne  and 
complementary instrument providing di ec  o  fo  he Union  e e nal olicie  
(Regulation (EU) No 234/2014, 11.03.2014). It was conceived as a tool to cope with 
major global challenges (including energy security, climate change and environmental 
o ec ion) and o o  he EU  strategic interests. Within this conception, the 
Partnership Instrument contains four main objectives: the provision of policy support 
fo  he EU  e e nal ela ion  and e on e  o global challenge ; ojec ion of he 
internal dimension of Europe 2020; the improvement of market access, trade, 
investments and business opportunities for EU companies; and the promotion of 
public diplomacy and academic cooperation. 1  In order to attain these objectives, 
shared values and a common vision are crucial. But it seems that in most cases, the 
launch of Strategic Partnerships has not been able to either facilitate achievement of a 
common vision or to create shared values in international politics and has not affected 
the external perceptions of the EU in a positive manner as Keukerleire and Delreux 
argued (2014, p. 291). In our opinion, the latter finding needs to be handled with a 
more cautious attitude. The 2015 survey of public opinion on the EU in ten EU strategic 
partners (PPMI/NCRE/NFG, 2015) demonstrated that the majority of the general 
public in most of these countries (with exception of Russia) had a positive view of the 
EU (con i ing of e  o i i e  and ome ha  o i i e  e on e ). For example, in 
the four BICS countries  the major global players  59 per cent of respondents in 
Brazil, 56 per cent in China, 63 per cent in India, and 53 per cent nearly chose positive 
descriptors when they were asked to describe the EU: strong, efficient and 
multicultural in Brazil; multicultural, modern and strong in China; modern, strong and 
efficient in India; and strong, modern and multicultural in South Africa 
(PPMI/NCRE/NFG, 2015).2 Public perceptions of the EU in Canada were also reported 
to be positive (see Chaban, 2019, in this Special Issue).  
Finall , mo  e onden  ac o  he BICS co n ie  e cei ed ha  he EU  leade hi  
role in world affairs as both desirable and likely. In terms of desirability, between 50 
per cent and 60 per cent of respondents in Brazil and China, and between 60 per cent 
and 70 e  cen  in India and So h Af ica a g e fo  he EU  ong leade hi  ole 
(PPMI/NCRE/NFG 2015). In terms of likelihood, in the four BICS countries between 
60 per cent and 70 per cent of respondents agree that the EU is likely to take a strong 
leadership role in the world affairs five years from now (PPMI/NCRE/NFG, 2015). 
Similar perceptions of the EU as a leader in terms of desirability and likelihood were 
detected in Canada (Chaban, 2019, in this Special Issue). This indicates that the 
institution of Strategic Partnership has strong potential to resonate with the public 
ega dle  i  lack of a clea  defini ion and an ac al a eg  fo  i  S a egic 
Partnerships with its selected partners (Knodt et al., 2018, 60-62). 
  
 
1 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/what-we-do/partnership_instrument_en.htm [05.05.2016]. 
2 Plea e no e ha  he m l ic l al  de c i o  a  een ambig o l , i h o en iall  nega i e conno a ion , a  




Lessons from the EU Strategic Partnerships with emerging 
powers: only a matter of time?  
In he college of he EU  en a egic a ne , Canada of en de c ibe  i elf  and is 
described by others  a  a in e en ial middle o e  ( ee al o Z la, 2019, in hi  
Special Issue). This status is distinctly different to the status ascribed to the US (once 
a global hegemon) or BRICS (emerging powers). At the same time, Japan, Mexico and 
South Korea are arguably comparable to the Canada case. In contrast to the latter 
g o , Canada  ela ion  i h he EU i  among he mo  ma e  with Canada 
opening its representation in Brussels already in the 1960s, and the EU opening its 
diplomatic mission in the middle of the 1970s. Can we assume that the duration of a 
strategic partnership is a factor influencing the quality of this partnership? 
From research on the EU strategic partnership in the sector of energy policy we have 
profound knowledge of the important factors on the quality of a Strategic Partnership 
(Knodt et al., 2015b). One factor influencing the quality of a Strategic Partnership is 
the timespan of the partnership. With regard to the emerging powers, China was 
among the first countries to be identified by the EU as an important partner in the 
European Security Strategy (European Council, 2003). Re ec i el , he EU  S a egic 
Partnership with China was established at the summits in 2003 and dated back to trade 
and economic cooperation in the 1980s. Indeed, the EU-China dialogue is the oldest 
one among the EU-BICS Strategic Partnerships, and it shows the highest activity rate. 
It has evolved considerably, with a detailed institutional set up, an amplification of 
cooperation areas and a high level of participants. However, the quality of the 
partnership has remained sub-optimal. Thus, research on EU-BICS relations gives 
only limited evidence for the assumption that time is the most important factor for the 
development to strike a high-quality partnership. The quality of other EU-BICS 
partnerships shows very similar challenges no matter of timing. As shown through a 
relevant network analysis, EU actors try to reach out to and communicate with the 
respective BICS actors rather than vice versa (Knodt et al., 2015a, 328-330). In 
addition, BICS actors play a more important role than the EU actors and dominate the 
network. The EU, however, is marginalized in the dialogue.  
Agreements and partnerships of the EU and member states towards the BICS are 
running on parallel tracks and have at times rivalled each other. Many actors in the 
BICS engage in cooperation with the EU and the member states at the same time. 
Research found a certain preference for the approaches of member states voiced by the 
BICS actors, as it seems unclear where exactly the value is added by cooperation with 
he ana ional in i ion  of he EU. The BICS co n ie  efe ence fo  
coo e a ion i h membe  a e  of en de i e  f om he EU  nclea  manda e  and 
offe  fo  ene g  coo e a ion. Thus, the EU needs to carve out clearly its message on 
value added and identify the role it would like to play in energy cooperation with the 
BICS (Piefer et al., 2015, p. 350f). 
This priority assigned by the BICS to the dialogue with EU member states seems to be 
similar in other bilateral dialogues. Also, the pattern of relations is alike: the relation 
with the EU and with its member states often go on tracks parallel to each other. 
Relevant research also points to the lack of knowledge among BICS on membe  a e  
bilateral relations with third countries other than their own. 
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Specifically, for BICS, research demonstrates a low level of interest in the EU in those 
co n ie . Thi  con a  he EU  in e e  o de elo  con ac  i h he e fo  eme ging 
powers. Ambiguity of interests and objectives are prevalent on both sides  the EU and 
BICS, with both sides profiling a deficit of commitment to the dialogue. Research in 
the field also observed mutual perceptions of unclear agendas and even a lack of trust. 
The cacophony of the multiple EU voices  something known in the literature as the 
EU not 'speaking with one voice'  and institutional fragmentation further complicates 
the relationship with these strategic partners. Studies in those countries found 
inadequately defined roles for the EU and overall marginalization of the EU in the 
dialogue, which may result in highly fragile forms of coordination. The absence of a 
clear leading position may disturb EU-BICS cooperation and some actors have to face 
the risk of being isolated from informal communicative networks and information 
exchange within the dialogues (Piefer et al., 2015, p. 349f). 
All the above listed limitations and problems of the EU-emerging power relations do 
not seem to appear in the EU-Canada Strategic Partnership. We ask what is different? 
The development of the EU-Canada strategic relationship ± an 
ever-closer relationship? 
The EU-Canada relationship can be dated to the beginning of the European 
Communities in the 1950s. Amy Verdun groups the history of the EU-Canada 
relationship into four-time periods (Verdun, 2019, in this Special Issue), starting with 
the first period from 1959-1976 where a first agreement was signed between the 
European Atomic Energy Community and Canada in 1959. The EU-Canada 
relationship was deepened with the 1976 Framework Agreement for commercial and 
economic cooperation between the European Communities and Canada. The start of 
the second period from 1977-1996 is characterized by regular middle up to high level 
meetings, the 1990 Declaration on Transatlantic Relations between the European 
Community and its Member States and Canada, as well as the 1996 Joint Political 
Declaration on EU-Canada Relations and Joint EU-Canada Action Plan. These 
framework agreements were accompanied by several sectoral agreements which 
Verdun lists in her contribution to this Special Issue. Specifically, the third period 
between 1997 and 2008 showed many of those sectoral agreements. In 2004, both 
partners agreed on the EU-Canada Partnership Agenda, and in 2005, on the 
Agreement between the EU and Canada establishing a framework for the participation 
of Canada in the EU crisis management operations. Attempts to negotiate a free trade 
agreement failed at that time. The forth and current period, according to Verdun 
(2019), started in 2009 with a sectoral agreement and the effort to negotiate a free 
trade agreement as well as working towards a strategic partnership. It was only in 2016 
that both agreements, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 
and Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) were signed by the EU and Canada after 
long negotiations. The EU-Canada relations have been strengthened significantly in 
the last four years.  
As the quote at the beginning of this introduction stated, the partnership over these 
periods is based on similar values and interests of both partners (Bendiek and 
Schenuit, 2019, in this Special Issue). Nathalie Garon, from the Canadian Global 
Affairs Office, stated with regard to the Strategic Partnership Agreement between 
Canada and he EU, ha  i  eflec  o  ha ed f ndamen al al e  (Ga on, 2016). 




terrorism; the promotion of human rights and non-proliferation; clean energy, 
environment and climate change; migration and peaceful pluralism; sustainable 
development; and innovation. Federica Mogherini, the former High Representative of 
he Union fo  Fo eign Affai  and Sec i  Polic , confi med hi  oin : We a e 
completely likeminded partners and since the signing of recent agreements our 
ela ion  mo ed o an e en dee e  and onge  a ne hi  (E o ean Co ncil, 
2017). We argue, this like-mindedness and normative affinity distinguishes the EU-
Canada Strategic Partnership from partnerships the EU has with emerging powers, 
where this kind of compatibility is missing.  
In contrast to the current stance of the US government under Trump administration, 
the EU-Canada summit in July 2019 in Montreal dedicated a long section of its joint 
declaration on the SPA to the joint action to defend a rule-based international order. 
It stated:  
We reaffirm the importance of protecting, reforming and renewing the rules-
based international order, with the UN at its core. We are opposed to all 
attempts to undermine laws, norms and institutions that govern peaceful 
international cooperation. We are united in our commitment to multilateralism, 
democracy and the rule of law (Joint Declaration, 2019). 
One powerful example of this shared commitment to multilateralism could be seen in 
the EU-Canada strong common interests in the areas of climate and energy policies. 
Both partners support the ambitious and effective implementation of the Paris 
Agreement by all parties and agreed to work with our international partners to that 
end (Joint Declaration, 2019). It looks like the new Commission under the leadership 
of P e iden  U la on de  Le en and i  E o ean G een Deal  of 2019 ill ha e an 
impact on the EU-Canada climate and energy policy cooperation. 
That the EU-Canadian strategic partnership is reaching a higher level of cooperation 
can be also seen in the involvement of Canada as a third state in the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the 
EU. As Bendiek and Schenuit elaborate in this Special Issue, the EU has a vital interest 
in he enhancemen  of he a egic CFSP/CSDP a ne hi , in o de  o e ond o 
the evolving challenges in the area of security and defence (migration, counter-
e o i m and h b id h ea  (Bendiek and Schen i , 2019). S ch coo e a ion can 
take different shapes. Canada has contributed for example to different missions and 
operations within the Western Balkans countries (e.g. EUFOR Althea, EULEX Kosovo, 
EUPM BiH and EUFOR Concordia). It also took part in the EU Advisory Mission in 
Ukraine providing management and technical expertise. In addition, Canada signed a 
Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) with the EU in November 2005. Two 
partners also started new initiatives in the area of cybersecurity as a key priority within 
the CSDP (Bendiek and Schenuit, 2019). Moreover, the Permanent Structured 
Cooperation (PESCO) of the EU, founded in 2017 to improve defence cooperation 
among the EU member states, was opened for Canada to join as a third state 
(Leuprecht and Hamilton, 2019, in this Special Issue).  
If compared with other Strategic Partnerships, the EU-Canada partnership has a high 
degree of institutionalisation. Under the SPA, an EU Canada Joint Ministerial 
Committee (JMC) was set up in 2017 in order to strengthen the EU-Canada bilateral 
relationship, to enhance foreign policy coordination and, to address global challenges 
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and opportunities. It is supported by the Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC), which 
among other duties, monitors the developments in the strategic relationship and 
makes recommendations for efficiencies, greater effectiveness and synergies between 
the Parties. The JCC also provides an annual report on the state of the relationship to 
the JMC.  
Continuity is yet another feature of this partnership. In reaction to the Canadian 
elections in October 2019, and the re-election of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, the 
EU welcomed the foreseeable continuity of the EU-Canada coo e a ion: The o come 
of he Canadian elec ion  gi e   he con in i  of he o k e e done, and e ee 
that this o k ill con in e. So he efo e, he ke o d fo   i  con in i ,  Pe e i  
Ustubs, the EU envoy to Canada, said in an interview with The Globe and Mail 
(Blanchfield, 2019, online). 
This rather constructive and multifaceted mode of interaction, characteristic of the 
present-day relations has not been a given constant. It has had its ebbs and flows. For 
some, it is Canada who needs to decide what is strategic. In this context we adopt 
concepts of alignment, dealignment and realignment once proposed to describe 
elections and party politics in Canada (Johnstone, 2013). We borrow and apply these 
concepts to explain the evolution of the EU-Canada relations. Historical alignment of 
Canada with the UK was revised by Canada when the UK joined the EEC. A certain de-
alignment with the UK  and specifically a severance of preferential trade agreements 
 was later replaced by a pragmatic policy of diversification (and, arguably, re-
alignment with the UK and the EEC/EC/EU in terms of trade). The trading frictions 
between the EU and Canada in the 1980s and 1990s, once again triggered 
realignments, while subsequent development of the dialogue led to revision of the 
course on both sides and realignment that led to CETA in 2009. SPA is arguably an 
example of an alignment in political-normative vision. The logic of alignment, 
dealignment and realignment which chart the evolution of the relationship, informs 
contributions to this Special Issue. Such a perspective triggers consideration of the 
relations between the EU and Canada factoring the temporal dimension. Contributions 
to this volume engage with a set of historical distances (see also Chaban and Chaban, 
2018)  very recent events in the EU and Canada, their bilateral relations and on the 
global stage, as well as events since the start of the European project, as well as events 
that took place over longer periods of centuries. The contributions to the Special Issue 
ask how the short to medium and then to long-term temporalities may help to highlight 
the ups and lows of the relationship, and provide nuances to current developments and 
future outlooks? 
Drivers of cooperation between the EU and Canada  
Recognising the historical outlook and longitudinal perspective as crucial, 
contributions to the Special Issue pose what are the most recent drivers of cooperation? 
In this regard, contributions consider not only the pattern of engagement or a time 
horizon of interactions, but also geographical imaginations (see also Chaban, 2019, in 
this Special Issue). Here, the regional, North American, dimension is paramount. 
Canada  e  clo e link  o and de endencie  on i  neighbo , the US, means that the 
US will remain a constant in how Canada sees its role in the region and in the world. It 
is one of the main external drivers of the EU-Canada strategic partnership, identified 
in the literature and as well as in this issue, and has to be seen in the US policy towards 




Three most recent US-related factors are seen to impact EU-Canada relations in the 
fo e eeable f e: high ola ili  of US fo eign olic  nde  T m  admini a ion, 
he US  preference for bilateralism and its stronger emphasis on its national interests. 
Benjamin Zyla (2019, in this Special issue) argues, that President Trump, who openly 
e ion  he old  o ld o de , h ea ening o di ega d in e na ional la , di e ec  
in e na ional in i ion  and e e ing o an i ola ioni  US fo eign olic  [ ] ha  
significantly undermined the transatlantic alliance and its commitment to 
m l ila e ali m . Thus, of recent Canada and the EU realise that their predominant 
orientation towards the United States has to be diversified (Verdun, 2019, in this 
Special Issue; Croci and Verdun, 2004).  
In this con e , Canada ma  eek in he EU a co n e eigh  o he US  
unpredictability, self-focus and reneging on multilateral rule-based global order. The 
EU-Canada a ne hi  ma  be al o in en ified b  T m  fo eign olic  o 
increasingly reorient away from the partners in Europe and Canada towards the 
emerging powers of the global south. Further away from Canada is another global 
hea eigh   China. China  economic e fo mance and m l ila e al ini ia i e  a e 
al o edic ed o im ac  Canada  ela ion  i h he EU.  
Beside external drivers, internal developments of the EU can have a strong impact on 
the EU-Canada relationship. One example is the Global Strategy for the European 
Union  Fo eign and Sec i  Polic  (E o ean Union, 2016). Re ea ch in he field of 
EU strategic partnerships indicates that the EU-Canada relations were strengthened 
in he ecen  ea . Thi  ma  be a eflec ion of he EU  Global S a eg  (2016) hich 
e c ibed fo  he EU  Fo eign and Sec i  Polic  be e  and clo e  coo e a ion i h 
third states. However, the EUGS has been a source of discontent  it mentioned 
Canada a  a  of he A lan ic  egion onl  in one in ance, hile o e looking i  in 
another one  the one that linked the transatlantic region only to the US. Despite this 
oversight, the relationship has been marked my major benchmarks  the successful 
negotiations of the major economic framework of CETA (which currently awaits its 
final ratifications) and signing of the top-profile political agreement of SPA. The two 
agreements demonstrate how the partners are succeeding in finding common grounds. 
The former one is noted by relevant literature to be driven by Canada, the latter one is 
advocated by the EU heavier than by Canada. Whatever the preferences, the two 
agreements reflect the range of interests in EU-Canada relations from both sides. 
CETA is now cited by the EUGS as an example for similar free trades agreements with 
other third countries (the US, India or Japan).  
Naturally, events and developments that take place in Europe are of great importance 
too. Canada has cherished special relations with the UK and France over the centuries, 
and perhaps unsurprisingly Brexit is an outstanding issue for the EU-Canada dialogue. 
Perceptions of the project of European integration and the entry of the UK into the 
European Communities (with consequence to the members of the Commonwealth, 
including Canada) are discussed in detail by Chaban (2019). Separation of the UK from 
he EU ill ha e con e ence  fo  Canada  ela ion hi  i h he EU. In an in e e ing 
twist, Brexit will also put the question of ela ion  i h hi d a e  on o B el  
agenda. Can Canada be a role model for the UK after Brexit takes place? 
As such, Brexit is one of the most important internal drivers in EU-Canada relations. 
It urges the EU to invest more in its bilateral relations, and specifically into the 
an a lan ic ela ion . Fo  decade , Canada  ela ion  i h he EU e e ha ed b  i  
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special relationship with the UK. This has put Canada in the role of a bridge-builder 
(Lyon and Tomlin, 1979) or linchpin (Simpson, 1999) for the US to Western Europe. 
Zyla (2019, in this Special Issue) describes this role which started being shaped after 
the end of World War I. Zyla (2019) and Chaban (2019) also argue that the role was 
facili a ed b  Canada  ecial a   he one of a middle o e . However, in times 
of T m  and B e i , he ole of a b idge-b ilde  i  in i k of di a ea ing. The 
separation of the UK from the EU and the loss of the special relationship between the 
US/Canada and the UK in the context of the EU-North America relations has 
consequences for the relationship of the EU to those two countries (see also Bendiek 
and Schenuit, 2019, in this Special Issue). 
Among other influential drivers are the ones on the Canadian side. Both Canada and 
the EU enter 2020 with new leaders at the helm. On the Canadian side, the outcome of 
the Canadian federal elections and the re-election of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau 
may guarantee the continuity of EU-o ien ed coo e a ion ( ee he EU  cong a la o  
note to Trudeau following the elections (Blanchfield, 2019, online)). On the EU side, 
new European Commission led by von der Leyen is formulating and projecting its 
priorities. As discussed above, many of these priorities  especially in the issue-areas 
of climate, upholding international multilateral rule-based order, as well as traditional 
and non-traditional security threats (see Leuprecht and Hamilton, 2019 and Hanouna 
et al., 2019, in this Special Issue)  are shared between Canada and the EU. In addition, 
Canada  fo eign olicy has always been influenced by its federal and highly 
decentralised institutional structure, including a special position for Quebec, where the 
regional governments gear quiet a great influence on foreign policy compared to other 
federal states (Zyla, 2019, in this Special Issue). Regional dynamics in Canada will 
influence how Canadians see the EU and EU-Canada relations and engage with the 
European Union (Chaban, 2019, in this Special Issue).  
Seen from an optimistic point of view, future outlines promising directions for the EU-
Canada dialogue. Can we then assume that positive interactions and mutual 
perceptions will lead this dialogue  now and in the future? Contributions to the SI 
also engage with the visions and narratives of the EU in Canada and Canada in the EU 
and provide nuanced insights into the evolutions of images. Perceptions that help to 
diagnose the situation and select actions are seen to be of relational nature (Chaban, 
2019, in hi  S ecial I e, ee al o Chaban and O Lo ghlin, 2018). Time seems to 
matter, as well as (imaginary) geography and the specific issue in focus. 
From a more cautious point of view, despite a rather advanced state of the dialogue 
between the EU and Canada in comparison to other strategic partners, there is still a 
substantial discrepancy between ambition and implementation as well as between 
rationality and emotions. These gaps will inform the content and course of the 
partnership and invite critical attention of the scholars. Our Special Issue is one of such 
attempt to address the gaps in the context of changing Europe in the changing world. 
Contributions to the Special Issue, presented below, engage with the two points of 
view. 
Overview of the contributions  
Amy Verdun sets the background to our Special Issue. She gives an overview on the 
EU-Canada relations since the late 1950s with special focus on the latest agreements. 




EU signed with an industrialised third country. Modest strengthening of the ties was 
achieved with the 2004 EU-Canada Partnership Agenda. A fully-fledged free trade 
agreement was in the works at this time but suspended in 2006. The EU-Canada SPA 
and CETA did not materialise until more than a decade later, in 2016. This article 
focuses in particular on the strategic partnership dimension. It explores why an SPA 
was possible in 2016, but not before. To answer this question, the study looks at four-
time periods. Specifically, it explores the origins of the EU-Canada agreement, how the 
EU-Canada relationship changed over time, and how a more profound strategic 
partnership came about when it did. The article considers institutional, domestic and 
geopolitical factors. In conclusion, it briefly speculates about the possible future of this 
partnership. 
Annegret Bendiek and Felix Schenuit continue the argument developed by Amy 
Verdun. They discuss a growing affinity and synergies between Canada and the EU 
following the latest benchmarking economic and political agreements of CETA and 
SPA. The article argues the mutual interests of Canada and the EU in international 
cooperation, the convergence of their values and cooperation in a number of areas, and 
growing relevance of this bilateral cooperation in the current era marked by challenges 
to the multilateral rule-base order. The authors select to focus on two issue-areas in 
this cooperation  peace and security and climate change. Bendiek and Schenuit see 
these areas to be among most politically contested foreign and security issues. The 
article explores how the cooperation between Canada and the EU in these areas  both 
in a bila e al mode a  ell a  i hin a ne l  c ea ed Alliance fo  M l ila e ali m  
(created in 2019 uniting 60 countries)  may contribute to the preservation and 
meaningful reform of multilateral institutions, in the nearest future and for years to 
come. 
Focusing on the relationship between Canada and the EU, contribution by Natalia 
Chaban proposes a comprehensive model to explain perceptions of this relationship. 
Treating perceptions as a relational concept, the article develops a geo-temporal matrix 
follo ing he men al ma  heo i a ion b  Didelon-Loiseau and Grasland (2014). The 
a icle  inno a i e model allo  to track the evolution of perceptions and discover 
diffe ing d namic  in he EU  e ce ion  o e  ime, de ending if he EU and EU-
Canada relations are seen in the Canada- vs. EU-specific contexts or on the global level. 
The regional factor  defined in he a icle no  onl  a  he No h Ame ican egion  b  
al o a  he T an a lan ic iangle  and he Common eal h   adds to the complex 
men al ma  of e ce ion . To demon a e he model in ac ion, hi  a icle con l  
the key works in this field of EU perceptions in Canada over the last decade. In its 
concluding discussion, the author argues how the awareness of the evolution of images 
and its particular dynamics may point to the areas where the EU could exercise the 
most impact in its relations with Canada in the period when the EU and the world are 
facing major challenges, including a threat to a rule-based global order. 
The article by Benjamin Zyla in i e  he eade  o e i i  he conce  of middle o e  
at times when the liberal international o de  effec i ene , legi imac  and a ho i  
are challenged by growing populism, nationalism and authoritarianism. The article, 
using Canada as a case-study, provides a comprehensive historical insight into the past, 
e en  and f e of he middle o e . Z la a g e  ha  he e o e  benefi ed 
substantially from the stable liberal international world order after World War II. In 
contrast, the present-day challenges to or changes of this order risk major loses and 
in abili  fo  middle o e . To co n e balance he g a e cena io , middle o e , 
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including Canada and the EU, could play a distinct role in this wave of changes, now 
and in he f e. In hi  ega d, Z la con ide  one ch f nc ion fo  middle o e  
 intra-alliance bridge-building. The article dissects the potential of Canada and the 
EU to engage in this process, and specifically in the context of the transatlantic orders. 
Zyla predicts that failure to succeed in protecting the rule-based liberal order means 
the threat to the economic prosperity, security, peace, and normative foundations that 
has nurtured the order. 
Security is the theme that leads contribution by Christian Leuprecht and Rhianna 
Hamilton. The authors consider benefits of the third-country participation  Canada  
in their case study  in he EU  ec i  ini ia i e PESCO (the Permanent Structured 
Cooperation). Conceived to address the concerns about burden-sharing in security 
domain, this initiative formulates among its objectives the improvement of internal 
defence cooperation, quick action and resource synergies. Importantly, PESCO has 
stirred some uneasy sentiments, and specifically in the US. The US wants its European 
allies to increase their share in security spending, however the US does not want to lose 
its influence on Europeans, and in NATO specifically. At the same time, some 
European partners (e.g. France) are keen to use PESCO as an instrument to solidify 
a egic a onom  fo  E o e in he ec i  a ena. The a icle a g e  ha  hi d 
countries who are keen to participate in PESCO  Canada including  turn out to be 
on the receiving end of these tensions. The exclusion of Canadians would disadvantage 
not only Canada, but also European and transatlantic partners. The authors explore 
how Canada and the EU have been and continue to be interdependent in the defence 
ma e  and ho  Canada  coo e a ion i h he EU i hin he PESCO f ame o k ill 
continue to serve Canadian interests and its commitment to multilateral global 
institutions.  
The contribution by Simo Hanouna, Omer Neu, Sharon Pardo, Oren Tsur and Hila 
Zahavi tackles a new challenge in global politics  international political meddling that 
aims at manipulating and undermining the democratic process and can challenge 
democracies and their values, as well as their societal resilience. The authors argue that 
both Canada and the EU face this problematic development. Informed by Christopher 
Walke  and Je ica L d ig  ha  o e  heo e ical f ame o k, he a e  in i e  
readers to examine the influence of the social media (and Twitter in particular) in the 
ha  o e  e e ci e. P o o ing a no el me hod fo  he a oma ic de ec ion of 
political trolls and bots active in Twitter, the paper engages with a large-N dataset built 
by thousands of accounts invested in Canadian politics (during the October 2019 
federal election campaign). The paper also introduces preliminary findings from the 
May 2019 EU Parliament election and the two 2019 rounds of elections in Israel. The 
authors discover a unique activit  a e n of he e in e ed  acco n , ignifican l  
different from accounts in a control group. A large-scale cross-cross-sectional 
approach used in the paper enables a distinctive perspective on the role of political 
communication and enables a debate how Canada and the EU may relate to each other 
in e on e o he ha  o e  infl ence  in he e en  and in he f e. 
Our Special Issue ends with an article written by a practitioner who is involved in the 
policy design and execution of EU-Canada strategic partner dialogue. The article by 
Antoine Rayroux (Rayroux, 2019, in this Special Issue) provides an overview of the 
discussions presented in the Special Issue. It outlines similar challenges the EU and 
Canada face in the third decade of the 21st century and sets policy recommendations. 




arguments. The strategic partnership between Canada and the EU  the two 
cham ion  and defende  of he le-based order  will have to find innovative ways 
to deal with the fundamental character of the threats presented by the changes to the 
international multilateral order. Both partners will have to ask perhaps uneasy 
e ion  abo  he US fac o  in hei  ela ion , no  la ly due to the retreat of the US 
from multilateralism. Both will have to revise and prioritise cooperation to address 
global threats  including climate crisis and hybrid security threats  when 
mechanisms of international liberal order may not work. And while these scenarios 
carry a grave undertone to them, a positive bridge-building potential of Canada and 
the EU towards each other and the world, their mutual respect, feeling of normative 
affinity and global know-how in shaping multilateral settings opens new uncharted 
opportunities for the two strategic partners in the rapidly changing world.  
Darmstadt and Christchurch, 2019 
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